"Samuel Day the the 22nd Iowa"
by

Chapter 8

Post-Script to the May 22 Assault on Vicksburg

 

The assault of May 22, 1863, Grant’s second attempt to take Vicksburg by frontal assault, was a stunning loss for an army that had already crushed one Confederate army (Johnston’s) and was expecting the quick defeat of another. In terms of casualties, the Union lost 3,199 men killed, wounded and missing in the assault. M^cClernand’s 13^th Corps suffered the majority of these casualties on the southern portion of the line. To attest to the severity of the fighting encountered by M^cClernand’s Corps, four of the five regiments with the greatest losses during the assault belonged to the 13^th Corps. Three of the top five highest regimental losses occurred in the assault on Fort Beauregard. Of all the forces in General Grant’s Army, the 22^nd Iowa suffered the greatest loss of any single regiment engaged. Included in the top five highest losses were two other regiments that participated in the assault on Fort Beauregard, the 77^th Illinois and 21^st Iowa. The top five regimental losses appear in William Fox’s Regimental Losses in the Civil War as follows(93) :

ASSAULT ON VICKSBURG

Total losses of the 22^nd Iowa were 164 killed, wounded and missing. The five companies suffering the most casualties were Company H with 38, Company C with 29, Company D with 24, Company E with 20 and Company I with 19. Many of casualties inflicted on Companies D and H occurred inside Fort Beauregard. Since no record exists of any member of Company E entering the fort, it can be assumed that they reached the ditch or parapet of the fort and served as sharpshooters and support.

Heroism was the call of the day for the Union troops involved in the assault of Vicksburg. Fifty-three Medal of Honors were awarded during the 19 and 22 May assaults on Vicksburg. One Medal of Honor was awarded to the First Sergeant of Samuel Day’s Company. Leonidas M. Godley, a 26 year old carpenter from Ashland, Iowa, earned the nation’s highest military honor for his part in the 22 May assault on Fort Beauregard. While leading his company up the parapet to the fort, a canister shot shattered his left foot. As he was tending to this wound, another shot carried off his left kneecap(96). His Medal of Honor citation reads: "Led his company [E] in the assault on the enemy’s works and gained the parapet, there receiving 3 very severe wounds. He lay all day in the sun, was taken prisoner, and had his leg amputated without anesthetics(97)." Sergeant Godley was discharged for disability after being paroled from the Confederates, and returned home to Iowa on September 4, 1863(98).

The story of one of the regiment’s fatalities illustrates the intensity of the struggle for the Railroad Redoubt. When the order to move was sounded, Private William M^cKeever was among those in Company C who charged the Confederate fortification directly in their front. When he was within fifteen rods of the fort, M^cKeever was struck in the chest by a Confederate slug and knocked to the ground. Lying in an exposed position, he attempted to crawl toward a small depression when he was hit by two more enemy bullets. He was later removed from the field and taken to the field hospital for treatment of his wounds(99). Private M^cKeever wrote the following letter home on June 12, 1863 from Geyosa Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, three days before he died of wounds received in the assault:

I was first hit with a spent ball in the Breast bairly entering the flesh but whitch knocked me down and disabled me from further duty during the day. I was trying to crawl off of the field and was next shot through the right knee by a shot from a rebel Sharp Shooter, Breaking the knee cap and disabling me very much. I however continued to crawl at such times as I thought was safe and when I was almost out of further danger was shot again in the small of the back, the ball passing in at my side- or Hip Bone- and rangingup, so as to to make a wound some eight inches in length(100).

After the failed assault, the dispute between Generals Grant and M^cClernand renewed with vigor over M^cClernand’s conduct during the attack. It was clear from past incidents that General Grant greatly mistrusted General M^cClernand. During the furious attack on Vicksburg, May 22, 1863, Grant received several urgent messages from M^cClernand calling for re-enforcements. Grant felt that M^cClernand grossly exaggerated his successes; M^cClernand believed he alone had breached the Vicksburg defenses and was not re-enforced in time to capitalize on his gains. Grant states in his official report of the attack:

About 12 m. I received a dispatch from M^cClernand that he was hard pressed at several points, in reply to which I directed him to re-enforce the points hard pressed from such troops as he had that were not engaged. I then rode around to Sherman, and had just reached there when I received a second dispatch from M^cClernand, stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of and still held two of the enemy’s forts; that the American flag then waved over them, and asking me to have Sherman and M^cPherson make a diversion in his favor. This dispatch I showed to Sherman, who immediately ordered a renewal of the assault on his front. I also sent an answer to M^cClernand, directing him to order up M^cArthur to his assistance, and started immediately to the position I had just left on M^cPherson’s line, to convey to him the information from M^cClernand by this last dispatch, that he might make the diversion requested. Before reaching M^cPherson, I met a messenger with a third dispatch from M^cClernand, of which the following is a copy:

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
In the Field, near Vicksburg, Miss., May 22, 1863.

Maj. Gen. U. S. GRANT:

GENERAL: We have gained the enemy’s intrenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to M^cArthur to re-enforce me if he can. Would it not be best to concentrate the whole or a part of his command on this point?

JOHN A. M^cCLERNAND,

Major-General, Commanding.

P. S. ¾ I have received your dispatch. My troops are all engaged, and I cannot withdraw any to re-enforce others.

 

General Grant continued,

The position occupied by me during most of the time of the assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on in front of the Thirteenth Army Corps than I believed it possible for the commander of it to have. I could not see his possession of forts, nor necessity for re-enforcements, as represented in his dispatches, up to the time I left it, which was between 12 p.m. and 1 p.m., and I expressed doubts of their correctness, which doubts the facts subsequently, but too late, confirmed. At the time I could not disregard his reiterated statements, for they might possibly be true; and that no possible opportunity of carrying the enemy’s stronghold should be allowed to escape through fault of mine, I ordered Quinby’s division, which was all of M^cPherson’s corps then present but four brigades, to report to M^cClernand, and notified him of the order. I showed his dispatches to M^cPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as much force in their fronts as possible. The diversion was promptly and vigorously made, and resulted in the increase of our mortality list fully 50 per cent., without advancing our position or giving us other advantages.

About 3.50 p.m. I received M^cClernand’s fourth dispatch as follows:

HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
May 22, 1863.

Maj. Gen. U.S. GRANT,
Department of the Tennessee:

General: I have received your dispatch in regard to General Quinby’s division and General M^cArthur’s division. As soon as they arrive I will press the enemy with all possible speed, and doubt not I will force my way through. I have lost no ground. My men are in two of the enemy’s forts, but they are commanded by rifle-pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken, who intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment I am hard pressed.

JOHN A. M^cCLERNAND,

Major-General, Commanding.

 

Grant concludes,

 

The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining; no falling back, nor other evidence of demoralization. After the failure of the 22^d, I determined upon a regular siege. The troops being now fully awake to the necessity of this, worked diligently and cheerfully(101).

 

Grant placed the blame for the failed assault and the increase in casualties squarely on M^cClernand. M^cClernand on the other hand, accused Grant of ignoring repeated messages for help and criticized Generals Sherman and M^cPherson for their lackluster efforts during the assault. Some historians believe that while Sherman and M^cPherson lightly engaged the enemy, M^cClernand threw everything he had at the Confederates. This is evidenced by his dispatch stating the he had no troops to draw from to re-enforce his men in the forts(102) .

M^cClernand responded to Grant’s charges in his own report of the incident, including a copy of all dispatches sent during the assault. He also added the testimony of individual commanders involved in the assault to vouch for his claimed successes. These accounts appear to concentrate on two main points of contention between Grant and M^cClernand: that M^cClernand’s men did not succeed in taking the enemy’s fort and that Grant could view the battle from M^cPherson’s headquarters better than M^cClernand could from his position near Maloney’s battery. While this controversy is not the subject of this work, it forms a part of the 22^nd Iowa’s history and the testimony provided gives a good picture of the regiment’s role in the assault on Vicksburg. Three members of the 22^nd Iowa, Colonel Stone, Lt. Colonel Graham, and Major Atherton provided testimony supporting M^cClernand. These testimonies not only defend General M^cClernand’s account of the events of May 22, but also provide a unique insight into the greatest military success of the 22^nd Iowa. Colonel Stone wrote(103),

KNOXVILLE, IOWA, September 8, 1863.

Major-General M^cCLERNAND:

In reply to your interrogatories presented by Mr. Jones, I state the following facts, which occurred under my observation, connected with the assault of the Thirteenth Army Corps upon the enemy’s works at Vicksburg on May 22 last:

I was in command of the Twenty-second Iowa, which regiment was in the Second Brigade, Fourteenth Division, of said corps. On the evening of May 21, I was served with a copy of the circular or order directing the assault to be made the-next day at 10 a.m. I was informed by my brigade commander (General Lawler) that I would have the advance, and that I could approach any point of the enemy’s works I considered the most salient, and in any form I thought proper. Between Sundown and dark I went up to within 50 yards of the enemy’s lines, and made a personal reconnaissance of the ground on our front and of their lines. My observations satisfied me that the fort next to the railroad could be carried more easily and with less sacrifice than any other point on our front, and I determined to direct my regiment against it. I took my regiment over the hill in front of Maloney’s siege battery that night, and had it in readiness for the morning’s work. At a little before 10 o’clock by my time, I received the order from General Lawler’s assistant adjutant-general to advance, and I did so immediately, supported by the Twenty-first Iowa. I advanced as I intended, directly against the fort, but in passing over the crest of the hill the enemy’s fire was so terrific that the left wing of my regiment was driven into the hollow on the left of the fort, but the right wing advanced steadily toward the fort, and within ten minutes from the time we started my men entered it, and held it, to my knowledge, for over an hour. The fort was small, and the open space inside very limited, and but few men could find room in it. When the enemy were driven from the fort, they also retired from the rifle-pits on the right (our right), between that and the railroad. The Eleventh Wisconsin had also advanced against the second fort, some 300 yards from the first one, and I saw the enemy leave that one. They also retired from the pits between the two forts, and went down the hill into the ravine or hollow beyond toward the city, leaving only a few straggling sharpshooters behind. I stood with Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlap, of the Twenty-first Iowa, on the highest and most exposed point near the fort. We saw them leave and conversed about it. I sent word back to General Carr to send me a brigade and I would hold the works. I regarded the thing as easily done. I do not know that my message reached the general.

I then regarded the door to Vicksburg as opened, and so said to Colonel Dunlap, and we were there looking over the ground, congratulating ourselves upon our success, when I was shot in the arm by a sharpshooter from the woods beyond their rifle-pits, and he was killed. I ordered the color-bearer of the Seventy-seventh Illinois to bring up his colors, as mine were down in the hollow on the left, and my own men planted them on top of the fort. Soon after this my own colors were brought up and placed beside them. They remained there to my certain knowledge till 6 o’clock in the evening. Had we been re-enforced at any time before 12 a.m. by a fresh brigade, I have no doubt that the whole army could have gone into Vicksburg. After that my knowledge of the situation up there was not so good, as I had retired from the field. I stated this opinion to several after I went back. There were no interior works at that time in the rear of the line we held, as I could see far beyond. Maloney’s battery of siege guns was about 500 yards directly in the rear of our Operations, and commanded a fine view of all our movements. I do not know where General M^cPherson’s headquarters were, but I should think there was no point from which our Operations could have been so correctly observed as from this battery.

W. M. STONE,

Late Colonel Twenty-second Iowa

.

The following is a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Harvey Graham(104):

BENTON BARRACKS, MO., September 1, 1863.

Maj. Gen. JOHN A. M^cCLERNAND:

Your note of August 26 has Just been handed to me by Mr. Jones, and in reply I hasten to say:

1. That on May 22, ultimo, when the combined assault was made upon the enemy’s works at Vicksburg, my position was such as afforded me only an opportunity of viewing the doings of Lawler’s brigade. Early in the morning of that day my regiment was formed in line on the extreme right of Lawler’s brigade, and as we led the advance I can only speak of the successes attending that portion of your command. It is my firm conviction and belief that had the Thirteenth Army Corps been re-enforced by a few brigades, thus enabling you to send support to the front, the success of your command would have been complete. As it was, success was achieved, but was afterward lost. Victory was in your hands, but was wrested from you by superior numbers.

2. At 10 a.m., I, with some 200 of my command, charged upon the defenses of the enemy, and within thirty minutes had stormed one of the forts and driven the enemy away from the front of their works, and had possession of his intrenchments. This was one of the principal forts of the enemy, and was situated almost directly in front of Maloney’s battery of Parrott guns. My command held their position there until nearly dark, when, from the want of proper support, they were captured. Sergeants [N. C.] Messenger and Griffith, of Company I, Twenty-second Iowa, entered the fort with about 20 men, capturing many prisoners, and remaining inside the works until nearly all were killed. This occurred between 10.30 and 12 m., as near as I can judge. Sergeant Griffith was inside the fort over an hour, and had I had the men to send to his aid, I could have retained it in full possession.

3. Two stand of colors were planted upon the parapet of the fort by 11 a.m., and remained there all day, in spite of all the efforts of the enemy to capture them. Late in the evening, as it was nearly dark, they were taken, having floated for over nine hours on the highest portion of the works.

4. Between 11 a.m. and 12 m. I observed that the enemy all along the line, especially at the fort to my right, seemed to be panic-stricken, and it is my impression that could a strong attack have then been made, the works would have all been carried.

5. The ground upon which Maloney’s battery was situated was about 600 yards from the works of the enemy, and was the most commanding position in the neighborhood, and afforded ample opportunity for witnessing all the movements of the Thirteenth Army Corps. From my position on the fort I could see nothing of that portion of the field where General M^cPherson’s headquarters were, and am convinced no one could observe the Operations of my command from that point.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HARVEY GRAHAM,

Lieutenant-Colonel Twenty-second Iowa Infantry.

A letter from Major J. B. Atherton states(105),

KNOXVILLE, IOWA, September 5. 1863.

Maj. Gen. JOHN A. M^cCLERNAND:

DEAR SIR: In answer to certain questions propounded by you concerning my knowledge of the action of the Thirteenth Army Corps in the assault upon the enemy’s defenses in the rear of Vicksburg on May 22 last, I would state:

1. That I was major of the Twenty-second Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry, and participated in said assault. I was with the left wing of my regiment, and, from the rough and uneven character of the country and the abatis of the enemy, could not see the action of any but my own brigade The assault began near 10 a.m., and within three-quarters of an hour from that time the colors of our regiment and one other (Seventy-seventh Illinois) were raised upon the fort immediately in our front. The fort was occupied by our men from one to two hours. Our colors remained upon it for the same time. We were successful, and could have held what we had gained had we been re-enforced at the proper time. We were compelled to fall back before superior numbers of the enemy and our men to abandon the fort.

2. The enemy was driven from the fort above referred to. It was occupied by our men; held by them over an hour¾ as long as it was possible to hold it without additional force. The two stand of colors mentioned in my answer to the first interrogatory were planted on it, one of which remained there several hours.

3. I have ever been of opinion, and have no doubt, that had we been re-enforced by two divisions when in possession of the fort, we would have held it, forced our way through the enemy’s works, and driven them from our right and left. The possession of this fort by us divided the enemy, and prevented them from rallying rapidly from right to left as occasion might require, giving us command of the rifle-pits on either side, which could soon have been cleared of the enemy, and an entrance made for any number of troops needed.

4. The position of Maloney’s battery being immediately in our rear and on a high point, afforded a much better opportunity for witnessing the action of the Thirteenth Army Corps than any position a half mile or more either to the right or left of it could afford.

I am, general, with much respect, your obedient servant,

J. B. ATHERTON,*

Late Major Twenty-second Iowa Infantry.

Several additional letters describe the assault(106):

SAINT NICHOLAS HOTEL,
Springfield, Ill., August 24, 1863.

GENERAL: In answer to your inquiry of this date, I have to say that I was detached from my regiment by order of Major-General Grant, with orders to report to you for duty upon your staff. I was with you in the siege of Vicksburg up to the evening of May 22, when I was wounded and caught by you in your arms as I fell. On May 22 I was repeatedly sent by you to different parts of the field, and had good opportunities of knowing what was done by your corps (Thirteenth) on that occasion.

At 10 o’clock your columns of attack moved forward to the assault. In less than one hour, Joseph E. Griffith, a sergeant of the Twenty-second Iowa, with a part of the storming party, entered one of the works of the enemy, drove the enemy out, and held the place for some hours. He captured 13 men with a lieutenant in this work, and reported them to you about 2 o’clock. Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, of the Twenty-second Iowa, with a small detachment, entered another fort and drove the enemy out, maintaining himself there until after nightfall, when the enemy massed their forces upon us and drove us back from our line, which was up to the works of the enemy, capturing Lieutenant-Colonel Graham and his men. The American flag floated from on top of two of the enemy’s works, and our men kept them there until after nightfall, as I am informed. They were there when I was wounded, which was after 5 o’clock. All this time many of our men were in the ditches of the enemy, and sent back for spades and shovels with which to dig down the enemy’s works.

About 5:30 o’clock a part, if not the whole, of Quinby’s division arrived. M^cArthur did not arrive until next day (May 23). I believed then if the two divisions had arrived in reasonable time that we would have been able to have pushed through the lines of the enemy. It was so believed by every officer I saw.

Your position during the assault was to the left and a little to the rear of our battory [sic] of 30-pounder Parrotts, which was about 600-yards from the enemy’s works. We could plainly see the line of works in our front and to the extreme left of our corps, but a part of the right was obstructed by the foliage of a grove of trees. This was the best point for observation along our entire line, and from the top of the battery, where you often went for observation, you could see perfectly everything in our front from right to left

In my opinion, it was about 1½ miles from the elevated point in General M^cPherson’s line from which he and General Grant made observations. The position occupied by them was perhaps higher ground, but I do not believe they could observe our movements with the accuracy we could from the position occupied by you.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

H. C. WARMOTH,

Late Lieutenant-Colonel Aide-de-Camp.

Letter of F. H. Mason, late captain and aide-de-camp.

SPRINGFIELD, ILL., August 24, 1863.

Maj. Gen. JOHN A. M^cCLERNAND:

SIR: Your note of this morning is received, and in reply I beg leave to submit the following report:

1. I was acting throughout the attack on Vicksburg in the capacity of aide-de-camp on your staff, and being sent at various times to your division and brigade commanders with orders, inquiries, &c., and being all the remainder of the time, when not thus occupied in your immediate presence, taking notes of the various incidents and hearing the various messages and reports brought by staff and general officers to you, I enjoyed as good advantages for hearing and seeing the assault and the part you took as could he possible for any one in my capacity.

2. At about 10.10 a.m. on the 22^d, I saw the advance of General Lawler’s brigade, of Carr’s division, rush up the slope leading to the large work of the enemy immediately to the left of the railroad. Though met by a fierce fire, they continued to advance, leaped into the ditch, and began to climb the enemy’s parapet. A moment afterward a flag was planted on the crest of the parapet and held there by two men, while a party of fifteen or twenty (as I should judge) sprang over into the fort, immediately after which those of the enemy who had been firing over the part of the fort opposite to where the entrance was made disappeared, leading me to the belief that they had all been driven by our men from the works. At this time you observed that the assaulting column was weak, and ordered it to be vigorously supported, and also sent an aide to General Carr, with orders to push Benton forward to create a diversion in favor of General Lawler, or, if necessary, to his immediate support. Immediately afterward information was brought to you that the advance of General Smith’s division had effected a lodgment and forced the enemy to abandon a portion of his rifle-pits; but whether the interior of the works had been reached, or merely the ditch, I did not understand. A part, of the language of the officer bringing the report was that "our flag is planted on the enemy’s works." At 11.46 an officer arrived and said that the fort first referred to was ours, and asked you to order that it should not be further fired upon. You seemed incredulous, and sent me to Colonel Landram, who was in a very advanced position, to ascertain as far as possible the exact state of the case. I found that officer, and, upon delivering my message, received from him, in addition to his confident opinion that the fort was ours, a note from Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, of the Twenty-second Iowa, with the remark that the "note was written inside the fort." This note, the contents of which I do not remember with sufficient accuracy to repeat, I delivered to you, believing fully that the fort was in our entire possession.

3. Although from the great length of the line occupied by the Thirteenth Corps, and the number of forts on the enemy’s line, the attack seemed desperate, yet it was my belief that with the aid of re-enforcements the position might be fully carried. On this point General Landram said at 1.50 p.m., "If General Osterhaus, on my left, will press forward, I think the works can soon be elected."

4. The position occupied by you during the day was a commanding knoll, about 600 yards from the enemy’s works, and upon which a battery of 30-pounder Parrotts had been planted. From this point all your line could be seen, except a part of General Smith’s command, which formed your extreme right, and which, though near, was partially hidden by the foliage of trees and the extreme unevenness of the ground. Your post of observation owed its entire safety to the slight parapet in front, as many of the enemy’s bullets went far beyond us into the woods, and men were continually being wounded all about you. The distance from the above point to General M^cPherson’s headquarters, where General Grant was located, was, in my judgment, 1¼ miles; and although General Grant’s position enjoyed some advantages in point of altitude, yet I cannot believe that this or any other place afforded nearly so good a view of the Thirteenth Corps as the one you occupied.

5. Boomer’s brigade arrived at 5 o’clock, and was sent to the front. Twenty minutes afterward a regiment arrived, and was held for some time in reserve near headquarters. This regiment may have been part of the Second Brigade, of Quinby’s division. The division of General M^cArthur arrived at 10 a.m. the day following.

6. The dispatches sent from time to time during the day to General Grant were less sanguine of success and less positive in regard to what had been already accomplished than my own opinion, and, as I believed, the opinion of the majority of your officers.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. H. MASON,

Late Captain and Aide-de-Camp.

Letter of A. A. Blount, late captain Seventh Ohio Volunteer Artillery.

SPRINGFIELD, OHIO, September 5, 1863.

Maj. Gen. J. A. M^cCLERNAND:

GENERAL: Your favor of August 23 is received, requesting me to state what I know about any of the colors of the Thirteenth Army Corps having been planted upon the enemy’s forts during the assault on May 22 upon the defenses of Vicksburg. In reply, I would state that I saw the colors of the Seventy-seventh Illinois Regiment planted upon the parapet of one of the enemy forts, as also were the colors of the Twenty-second Iowa Regiment, and that the men of the latter regiment occupied one side of the fort, which was divided by a traverse. I heard General Carr give orders to his artillery not to fire upon that fort, as it was in our possession. The regimental flag of the Seventy-seventh Illinois remained upon the parapet of the fort from eight to ten hours, when it was brought away. The national flag of the same regiment could not be brought away, and was covered with earth in the ditch. I saw upon another fort directly in front of my battery the colors of the Eighty-third Ohio Regiment, and I think those of the Sixteenth Iowa. There were colors of other regiments planted upon the extreme slope of the parapet and upon the crest of the glacis of other forts, where our men remained from eight to ten hours. It was the universal opinion of officers and men that had we sufficient force the fort occupied by our men could have been held.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. A. BLOUNT,

Late Captain Seventeenth Ohio Volunteer Artillery.

 

M^cClernand continued to write(107),

Other letters in my possession might be added, but they would extend this communication too much. Those already given will abundantly suffice for the purpose in hand. They not only prove all I have denied or affirmed, but they prove more. They prove the promptness of my assault; that Lawler’s and Landram’s commands, forming the column of attack on my left center, planted their colors on the enemy’s works; moreover, that they were carried inside of one of the main forts; that officers and men of the commands of one or both of them forced their way into the same fort; that observing that the assaulting column was weak, I ordered it to be supported; that immediately afterward information was brought to me that the advance of Smith’s division, together with Benton’s brigade, of Carr’s division, forming another column of attack, had effected another lodgment in the enemy’s works, and had also planted our flag on them; that prisoners had been captured and brought out of the fort assaulted by Lawler and Landram; that afterward an officer brought word to me that the same fort was ours, and a request that it should not be further fired upon; that, doubting, I sent a staff officer to verify the fact; that he brought word from Colonel Landram not only that the fort was ours, but a note from Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, of the Twenty second Iowa, with the remark that "the note was written inside of the fort," and that he was fully persuaded of the truth of the information; that the Twenty-second Iowa advanced against one fort, and the Eleventh Wisconsin against another, and that Colonel Stone and Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlap (killed) saw the Twenty-second and Twenty-first Iowa Regiments advance upon two different forts, and the enemy retire from both, and the rifle pits connecting them, down a hill and toward the city, and talked about it while it was going on. They prove that I could have used more men in making my assault, and with timely re-enforcements of two divisions would have crowned it with success; that my position was much more favorable than General Grant’s for seeing what was going on in front of my corps; that my position was near the center of my line, and only 500 or 600 yards from the enemy’s works, while General Grant’s was about 1½ miles to the right of my position; that my dispatches to General Grant were a qualification rather than an exaggeration of my success, and that the re-enforcements finally ordered by General Grant did not arrive in time, Quinby’s division only arriving about 5 o’clock, and too late to be properly formed and successfully applied, and M^cArthur’s not until next day.

As I have already shown, General Grant says that¾

The works entered by him (Sergeant Griffith) from its position could give us no practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time.

Is not this declaration too broad? Is it not as much as to say that no practical advantage could have been derived from taking any part less than the whole of the enemy’s works at once; that the possession of any part, however extended, flanked by other parts held by the enemy, would have been worthless? Is it not as much as to say that the only condition of our success was the impossibility of carrying the whole of the enemy’s line, which was much longer than our own, at once, and consequently that our attack must have been by our forces in line, instead of in column, as he directed? And yet, strange enough, he censures me for asking for the co-operation of a simultaneous attack by Sherman and M^cPherson, according to the terms of his original plan, and without which, by his own admission, "no practical advantage" could have resulted from Sergeant Griffith’s partial success. By his own showing, I only asked for what his original plan promised, and what, by his own admission, was necessary to our success.

This of itself is a sufficient refutation of the charge that what I asked for makes me responsible for the "increase of our mortality list fully 50 per cent"; but, apart from it, there is another essential fact which goes to the root of this whole matter, which makes General Grant responsible not only for the alleged increase of our mortality list, but for our whole loss, and which truth and justice require should be laid bare. I allude to General Grant’s order of May 21 for the assault. That order was issued by him with knowledge of the diminished numbers and exhausted condition of our forces, with knowledge of the roughness of the ground over which they had to pass, and with at least partial knowledge of the great strength of the enemy’s position and works, and was deemed not only by me, but by all my general officers who spoke to me upon the subject, as unfortunate and likely to bring disaster upon us rather than the enemy. My answer to these officers was that it was an order, and, if possible, must be executed. They answered, "if we fail it shall not be our fault," and their partial success while others failed, and the carnage of hundreds of their number who fell killed or wounded in gaining that success, conclusively testify that their final failure was not their fault; indeed, General Grant himself testifies to it, as I have already shown, by his admission in another part of his report that "the assault was gallant in the extreme * * * but the enemy’s position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken in that way "¾ by assault.

Comparing General Grant’s report with his dispatches, another discrepancy will appear. He says in his report that the asked-for "diversion was promptly and vigorously made * * * without advancing our position or giving us other advantages," leaving it to be inferred that unmitigated evil was the consequence of the diversion ; yet in one of his dispatches he says that "Sherman has gained some successes," and in another, dated 2.30 (two hours and a half after my dispatch stating that I had part possession of two forts), he says, "Sherman is getting on well," proving that the diversion was justifying itself and inspiring him with hope of success.

General Grant speaks of Sherman ordering "a renewal of the assault on his front," and of a "diversion" in my favor both by Sherman and M^cPherson, leaving the inference that there had been a cessation of the assault by both of them. This cessation was either by General Grant’s order or with his consent, or without both; and this brings me to a most grave and important point. If it was by General Grant’s order or with his consent, he failed to notify me of the fact, leaving me under the operation of his original order, discriminating against my corps and dooming it to stand in the breach and press the assault alone and unsupported, and, as a forlorn hope, to be destroyed in a desperate effort to accomplish an object that he had abandoned; and, if so, does not the blood of the hundreds of brave men who were thus sacrificed cry aloud against him? If it was without either his order or consent, it was a case of deplorable disobedience, and the same responsibility attaches to him for not advising me of it.

 

The dispute between Generals Grant and M^cClernand was officially settled on June 18, 1863, when accounts of M^cClernand’s congratulatory order praising the conduct of his own Thirteenth Corps for their conduct throughout the Vicksburg campaign appeared in several Northern newspapers(108):

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 72.

HDQRS. THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
Battle-field, in rear of Vicksburg, May 30, 1863.

COMRADES: As your commander, I am proud to congratulate you upon your constancy, valor, and successes. History affords no more brilliant example of soldierly qualities. Your victories have followed in such rapid succession that their echoes have not yet reached the country. They will challenge its grateful and enthusiastic applause. Yourselves striking out a new path, your comrades of the Army of the Tennessee followed, and a way was thus opened for them to redeem previous disappointments. Your march through Louisiana, from Milliken’s Bend to New Carthage and Perkins’ plantation, on the Mississippi River, is one of the most remarkable on record. Bayous and miry roads, threatened with momentary inundation, obstructed your progress. All these were overcome by unceasing labor and unflagging energy. The 2,000 feet of bridging which was hastily improvised out of materials created on the spot, and over which you passed, must long be remembered as a marvel. Descending the Mississippi still lower, you were the first to cross the river at Bruin’s Landing and to plant our colors in the State of Mississippi below Warrenton. Resuming the advance the same day, you pushed on until you came up to the enemy near Port Gibson. Only restrained by the darkness of night, you hastened to attack him on the morning of May 1, and by vigorously pressing him at all points drove him from his position, taking a large number of prisoners and small-arms and five pieces of cannon. General Logan’s division came up in time to gallantly share in consummating the most valuable victory won since the capture of Fort Donelson.

Taking the lead on the morning of the 2^d, you were the first to enter Port Gibson and to hasten the retreat of the enemy from the vicinity of that place. During the ensuing night, as a consequence of the victory at Port Gibson, the enemy spiked his guns at Grand Gulf and evacuated that place, retiring upon Vicksburg and Edwards Station. The fall of Grand Gulf was solely the result of the victory achieved by the land forces at Port Gibson. The armament and public stores captured there are but the just trophies of that victory. Hastening to bridge the South Branch of the Bayou Pierre, at Port Gibson, you crossed on the morning of the 3d, and pushed on to Willow Springs, Big Sandy, and the main crossing of Fourteen-Mile Creek, 4 miles from Edwards Station. A detachment of the enemy was immediately driven away from the crossing, and you advanced, passed over, and rested during the night of the 12th within 3 miles of the enemy, in large force at the station.

On the morning of the 13^th, the objective point of the army’s movements having been changed from Edwards Station to Jackson, in pursuance of an order from the commander of the department, you moved on the north side of Fourteen-Mile Creek toward Raymond. This delicate and hazardous movement was executed by a portion of your number under cover of Hovey’s division, which made a feint of attack in line of battle upon Edwards Station. Too late to harm you, the enemy attacked the rear of that division, but was promptly and decisively repulsed.

Resting near Raymond that night, on the morning of the 14^th you entered that place, one division moving on to Mississippi Springs, near Jackson, in support of General Sherman; another to Clinton, in support of General M^cPherson; a third remaining at Raymond, and a fourth at Old Auburn, to bring up the army trains.

On the 15^th, you again led the advance toward Edwards Station, which once more became the objective point. Expelling the enemy’s pickets from Bolton the same day, you secured and held that important position.

On the 16^th, you led the advance, in three columns upon three roads, against Edwards Station. Meeting the enemy on the way in strong force, you heavily engaged him near Champion’s Hill, and after a sanguinary and obstinate battle, with the assistance of General M^cPherson’s corps, beat and routed him, taking many prisoners and small-arms and several pieces of cannon. Continuing to lead the advance, you rapidly pursued the enemy to Edwards Station, capturing that place, a large quantity of public stores, and many prisoners. Night only stopped you.

At day-dawn on the 17^th, you resumed the advance, and early coming upon the enemy strongly intrenched in elaborate works, both before and behind Big Black River, immediately opened with artillery upon him, followed by a daring and heroic charge at the point of the bayonet, which put him to rout, leaving eighteen pieces of cannon and more than 1,000 prisoners in your hands.

By an early hour on the 18^th, you had constructed a bridge across the Big Black, and had commenced the advance upon Vicksburg.

On the 19^th, 20^th, and 21^st you continued to reconnoiter and skirmish until you had gained a near approach to the enemy’s works.

On the 22^d, in pursuance of the order from the commander of the department, you assaulted the enemy’s defenses in front at 10 a.m., and within thirty minutes had made a lodgment and planted your colors upon two of his bastions. This partial success called into exercise the highest heroism, and was only gained by a bloody and protracted struggle; yet it was gained, and was the first and largest success achieved anywhere along the whole line of our army. For nearly eight hours, under a scorching sun and destructive fire, you firmly held your footing, and only withdrew when the enemy had largely massed their forces and concentrated their attack upon you. How and why the general assault failed, it would be useless now to explain. The Thirteenth Army Corps, acknowledging the good intentions of all, would scorn indulgence in weak regrets and idle criminations. According justice to all, it would only defend itself. If, while the enemy was massing to crush it, assistance was asked for by a diversion at other points, or by re-enforcement, it only asked what in one case Major-General Grant had specifically and peremptorily ordered, namely, simultaneous and persistent attack all along our lines until the enemy’s outer works should be carried, and what, in the other, by massing a strong force in time upon a weakened point, would have probably insured success.

Comrades, you have done much, yet something more remains to be done. The enemy’s odious defenses still block your access to Vicksburg. Treason still rules that rebellious city, and closes the Mississippi River against rightful use by the millions who inhabit its sources and the great Northwest. Shall not our flag float over Vicksburg? Shall not the great Father of Waters be opened to lawful commerce? Methinks the emphatic response of one and all of you is, "It shall be so." Then let us rise to the level of a crowning trial. Let our common sufferings and glories, while uniting as a band of brothers, rouse us to new and surpassing efforts. Let us resolve upon success, God helping us.

I join with you, comrades, in your sympathy for the wounded and sorrow for the dead. May we not trust, nay, is it not so, that history will associate the martyrs of this sacred struggle for law and order, liberty and justice, with the honored martyrs of Monmouth and Bunker Hill?

JOHN A. M^cCLERNAND,

Major-General, Commanding.

 

M^cClernand’s veiled criticism of Generals Sherman and M^cPherson did not go unnoticed. An angry Sherman wrote,

The document under question is not technically a letter or report, and though styled an order, is not an order. It orders nothing, but is in the nature of an address to soldiers, manifestly designed for publication for ulterior political purposes. It perverts the truth to the ends of flattery and self-glorification, and contains many untruths, among which is one of monstrous falsehood. It substantially accuses General M^cPherson and myself with disobeying the orders of General Grant in not assaulting on May 19 and 22, and allowing on the latter day the enemy to mass his forces against the Thirteenth Army Corps alone(109).

 

M^cPherson wrote a similar letter to General Grant, complaining,

The whole tenor of the order is so ungenerous, and the insinuations and criminations against the other corps of your army are so manifestly at variance with the facts, that a sense of duty to my command, as well as the verbal protest of every one of my division and brigade commanders against allowing such an order to go forth to the public unanswered, require that I should call your attention to it. After a careful perusal of the order, I cannot help arriving at the conclusion that it was written more to influence public sentiment at the North and impress the public mind with the magnificent strategy, superior tactics, and brilliant deeds of the major-general commanding the Thirteenth Army Corps than to congratulate his troops upon their well-merited successes. There is a vain-gloriousness about the order, an ingenious attempt to write himself down the hero, the master-mind, giving life and direction to military Operations in this quarter(110).

 

Both Sherman and M^cPherson were quick to point out to Grant that the requirements of General Orders Number 151 (1862) forbids publication of all official letters and reports, and requires the name of the writer to be laid before the President of the United States for censure or dismissal. This is exactly the tool Grant used to get rid of M^cClernand. Grant’s message to the President reads(111):

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 164.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE,
Near Vicksburg, Miss., June 18, 1863.

* * * * * * * * * *

IV. Maj. Gen. John A. M^cClernand is hereby relieved from the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps. He will proceed to any point he may select in the State of Illinois, and report by letter to Headquarters of the Army for orders. Maj. Gen. E. O. C. Ord is hereby appointed to the command of the Thirteenth Army Corps, subject to the approval of the President, and will immediately assume charge of the same.

By order of Maj. Gen. U.S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

 

As expected, M^cClernand vigorously protested his dismissal to the President, the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, and to General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, requesting an investigation into the circumstances of his removal and his conduct during the Vicksburg campaign. Secretary of War Stanton replied(112):

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, September 14, 1863.

Maj. Gen. JOHN A. M^cCLERNAND,
Springfield, Ill.:

GENERAL: Your letter of the 5^th instant has been submitted to the President, who directs me to say that a court of inquiry embracing any one of the subjects specified in that letter would necessarily withdraw from the field many officers whose presence with their commands is absolutely indispensable to the service, and whose absence might cause irreparable injury to the success of Operations now in active progress. For these reasons he declines at present your applications, but if hereafter it can be done without prejudice to the service, he will, in view of your anxiety upon the subject, order a court.

Your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON,

Secretary of War.

 

Historians still debate the claims of Grant and M^cClernand regarding the actions of 22 May 1863. Did Grant’s mistrust of and intense hatred for General M^cClernand lead him to believe M^cClernand’s repeated requests for re-enforcements during the 22 May Vicksburg assault were inaccurate or purposely exaggerated to show ungained successes? Or had M^cClernand indeed gained a foothold in the Confederate bastion only to be forced to relinquish his gains because of a lack of support from Grant? The three written statements by members of the 22^nd Iowa in response to General M^cClernand’s attempt to regain his command and clear his name clearly support M^cClernand’s point of view. It is also evident that members of the 22^nd Iowa felt their hard-fought gains during the struggle for the Railroad Redoubt had gone unnoticed because of the Grant¾ M^cClernand controversy. S.C. Jones of the 22^nd Iowa wrote,

Notwithstanding General Grant’s failure in all his letters, reports, and history to recognize this act of the Twenty-second Iowa Regiment, these men and the thirteen prisoners that they captured within one of, if not the largest and strongest fort in the chain of forts in the rear of Vicksburg, is evidence enough of the bravery and gallantry of the boys of the Twenty-second, and is not to the credit of General Grant to thus ignore the fact(113).

 

Thus, it is safe to conclude that the boys of the 22^nd Iowa believe M^cClernand’s version of the events and that Grant failed to properly heed his repeated requests for re-enforcements. Veterans of the regiment got caught in the middle of a personal battle between Grant and M^cClernand and felt the successes earned by the blood of many of their comrades went largely ignored. Would the outcome have changed if Grant had sent sufficient and timely re-enforcements to M^cClernand?

The Vicksburg Battlefield is well preserved by the National Park Service and stands as a quiet reminder of the events of May 22, 1863. The Railroad Redoubt (or Fort Beauregard) is a prominent part of the Vicksburg National Military Park and is directly opposite the Iowa Memorial, the location of Carr’s Division on the eve of the attack. Park Service bronze plaques mark the location of the lines occupied by the 22^nd Iowa and its campsite. Adjacent to the Railroad Redoubt is the Texas Memorial, a tribute to Waul’s Texas Legion, the brave volunteers who retook the fort from the 22^nd Iowa. The fort is clearly marked to show the location where the 22^nd Iowa breached the fort’s walls, the deepest penetration by the regiment, and the path Waul’s Texans used to retake the fort. The park also marks the site of a long and costly siege, lasting through the hottest days of summer, and taking an incredible toll on Union and Confederate forces as well as Southern civilians trapped within the city.

(95) Fox, William F., Lt. Col. U.S.V. Regimental Losses in the American Civil War 1861-1865. Albany NY: Brandow Printing Co., 1898. p. 520.

(96) Burden, Jeffry C. "Into the Breach: The 22^nd Iowa Infantry at the Railroad Redoubt." Civil War Regiments, A Journal of the American Civil War, Volume Two, Number One. Campbell, CA: Regimental Studies, Inc., 1992. p. 30. Hereafter, this work will be cites as Burden, 22^nd Iowa Infantry at the Railroad Redoubt.

(97) United States Senate. Committee of Veterans’ Affairs. Medal of Honor Recipients. Washington. GPO, 1979. p. 97.

(98) Burden, 22^nd Iowa Infantry at the Railroad Redoubt. p. 30. Godley returned home to father 4 children and was awarded his medal in 1897.

(99) Mullins, Lafayette F., Captain, Company C, 22^nd Iowa Infantry. Letter, date unknown. Courtesy of David Proctor.

(100) M^cKeever, William, Private, Company C, 22^nd Iowa Infantry. Letter, dated June 12, 1863. Courtesy of David Proctor. Letter copied exactly as written.

(101) Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 1, pgs. 55-56.

(102) Ibid., p. 55.

(103) Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 1, pgs. 177-178.

(104) Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 1, pgs. 178-179.

(105) Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 1, p. 179.

^* Major Atherton was slightly wounded during the May 22 assault, resigned his commission on June 8, 1863, and returned to Iowa where he later penned this letter.

( 106) Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 1, pgs. 179-181.

(107) Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 1, pgs. 181-186.

(108) Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 1, pgs. 159-162.

(109) Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 1, p. 162.

(110) Ibid., p. 164.

(111) Ibid., pgs. 164-165.

(112) Ibid., p. 169.

(113) Jones, 22^nd Iowa, p. 155.

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