"Samuel Day the the 22nd Iowa"
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Chapter 5

The Battle of Champion’s Hill, Mississippi

General Grant’s forces were now in a precarious position¾ deep in Confederate soil without a sustained supply train for food or ammunition. Grant’s troops lay between two great Confederate armies; General Pemberton’s forces to the west and General Joseph E. Johnston’s army to the east at Jackson, Mississippi. Grant’s plan was to attack and destroy Johnston’s forces to the east so they would be unable to assist Pemberton at Vicksburg, Grant’s main objective.

Anticipating Grant’s strategy, General Johnston and ordered Pemberton to move his army away from Vicksburg and attack the rear of Grant’s army as it moved toward Jackson, Mississippi. This, he hoped, would place Grant’s forces in a vise between the two Confederate armies. Unfortunately, all prospects of success were dashed when Pemberton hesitated¾ he was unwilling to leave Vicksburg unguarded. At about 11 a.m., Grant’s forces met and engaged a brigade of General John Gregg’s Confederates near Raymond, Mississippi. The strength of the Confederate resistance coupled with reports from M^cClernand and Sherman indicated to Grant that considerable forces lay ahead at Jackson, just 15 miles to the east. After struggling with Gregg’s forces until late in the afternoon, Grant’s army pushed east, reaching Jackson on the evening of May 13. Late the following morning, Union forces under the command of Generals Sherman and M^cPherson attacked and routed the Confederates at Jackson, entering the captured city at 4 o’clock that afternoon. General Grant took the luxury of staying in the same hotel room occupied by General Johnston the previous evening. Johnston’s army retreated north, leaving Pemberton’s forces alone to stop Grant’s move toward Vicksburg.

General M^cClernand’s forces, including the 22^nd Iowa, did not directly participate in the assault of Jackson, but were tasked with guarding supplies and bridges to the west.

On May 15, Pemberton finally moved his army away from Vicksburg, leaving only 10,000 men to defend the city. He marched the remainder of his forces, over 23,000 men, through rain and high water hoping to locate and destroy Grant’s supply wagons.

Meanwhile, Grant intercepted Johnston’s message directing Pemberton to leave Vicksburg and attack Grant from the rear. Grant immediately turned his forces west to intercept the enemy. He ordered the destruction of Jackson and left Sherman behind to destroy the railroad and other public property that could be of use to the enemy.

Pemberton’s forces were expecting to attack the rear of a defeated army. Instead, they met the full force of Grant’s 32,000 man army, jubilant with victory from Port Gibson, Raymond, and Jackson. The two armies clashed for the first time on the plantation of Sid Champion.

Early in the morning of May 16, M^cPherson’s and M^cClernand’s forces encountered Confederate skirmishers near a prominent hill on the farm of Sid Champion. Once his forces were in position, Grant ordered the Union assault. M^cClernand immediately ordered Generals Smith and Osterhaus to "attack the enemy vigorously and press for victory(67)."

M^cClernand’s account of the battle reads:

A mile in front stood a hill some 60 or 70 feet high, covered with a thick wood. In this wood the enemy were drawn up in strong force, doubtless augmented by his tendency to his right, above noticed. This hill is indifferently called Midway or Champion’s Hill, from the fact of its being half way between Jackson and Vicksburg, and the reputed property of a citizen by the name of Champion. The space between the hill and my right was composed of undulating fields, exposed to the enemy’s fire, while the ground to its left and front was scarred by deep ravines and choked with underbrush, thus making a farther advance extremely difficult. Undaunted, the brave men of the Twelfth Division pressed on under a galling fire. By 11 a.m. the engagement became general all along the hostile lines, and continued to rage with increasing fury until after 12 m. Meantime the enemy had been driven back with great slaughter, quite 600 yards, leaving in our hands 300 prisoners and eleven pieces of cannon.

Rallying in his desperation, and bringing forward fresh troops, he poured down the road, and with superior numbers renewed the conflict. Not daring to cross the open fields in the direction of General M^cPherson, who had handled him roughly on the extreme right, his main force was directed against General Hovey. A crisis had come. Struggling heroically against the adverse tide, that officer called for the support of a division of General M^cPherson’s corps, hard by, which had not yet been engaged, but did not get it until his line was being borne back. The support finally came, and was also borne back. Slowly and stubbornly our men fell back, contesting every inch of ground lost with death, until they had neared the brow of the hill. Here, under partial cover, they rallied and checked the advance of the enemy, but a bold and decisive blow was necessary to retrieve the day in this part of the field. This was happily struck by General Hovey. Massing his artillery, strengthened by Dillon’s Wisconsin battery, upon elevated ground beyond a mound to his right, he opened an enfilading fire upon the enemy, which, challenging the cheers of our men, went crashing through the woods with deadly effect. The enemy gave way and the fortune of the day in this part of the field was retrieved. Generals Hovey’s and Crocker’s divisions pushed forward to the crest of the hill, while General Logan’s division, falling upon the flank of the broken foe, captured many prisoners. Five of the enemy’s guns that had been captured by General Hovey and had not been brought off again fell into our hands. The carnage strewing the field literally stamped Midway as the "Hill of Death." General Hovey had lost nearly one-third of his men, killed and wounded(68).

 

M^cClernand sent General Blair’s forces to support Smith and Carr’s to support Osterhaus, keeping Lawler’s Brigade, with the 22^nd Iowa in reserve. Lawler wrote:

At 10 a.m. heavy artillery and skirmish firing was heard in our front. The Ninth Division, General Osterhaus’, and the Tenth, General Smith’s, came upon the enemy strongly posted on a range of hills bordering Baker’s Creek. Osterhaus’ division drew up in position in the first large cane-field on the east side of the hills; Carr’s division was posted an a reserve, close column by division, a few hundred yards to the rear in the same field; Benton’s brigade on the right, and my brigade on the left of the road. Here we remained, resting on our arms during the forenoon and until 2 o’clock in the afternoon, when orders were received to move up to the corner of the field, leaving one regiment, the Eleventh Wisconsin Volunteers, as a support to the First Wisconsin and Seventh Indiana [Michigan] Batteries, which were in position in the center of the clearing.

Shortly after this I was ordered to move forward my command and occupy the ground between the left of the First Brigade and General Smith’s right, my right resting at the forks of the road. Instructions were given me to open communication with General Smith, keep it open during the engagement, and to anticipate any movement the enemy might make with a view to turn our left. To communicate with General Smith a company of skirmishers were sent forward, who soon succeeded in reaching his right.

Shortly afterward, the enemy engaged the Sixteenth Kentucky [?] and one other regiment, belonging to Osterhaus’ division, which had been sent out as skirmishers in advance of my brigade: The firing was spirited from both artillery and infantry, and compelled these regiments to give way and fall back toward a small field on our extreme left.

To support these regiments and to check the enemy’s advance, I moved my whole command down to the field, sending forward the Twenty-second Iowa (Colonel Stone) in the advance to annoy the enemy and attract his attention while the remainder of the brigade was getting into position. As we emerged from the woods into the field, the enemy opened fire upon us with musketry and a battery posted on a hill near the farm-house, subsequently used as a hospital, bursting several shells in close proximity to the head of the column, but doing no damage. The Peoria Battery was quickly brought forward to the rising ground in the center of the field, and, having opened on the enemy, soon silenced his battery and compelled him to withdraw it in haste. An advance of my whole line was then made, upon which the rebels broke and fled, pressed by the brigade as rapidly and closely as a proper precaution and the conformation of the ground would permit.

The two skirmishing companies of the Twenty-second Iowa, and those also of the Twenty-first and Twenty-third Iowa Regiments, succeeded in capturing and bringing in large numbers of prisoners and small-arms in abundance.

The enemy, after his flight commenced, did not attempt to make any determined stand; but while our skirmishers were advancing through the cleared field in the rear of the hospital, he opened fire upon them with two pieces of artillery, posted on a high hill to our left and in General Smith’s front. Immediately ordering up the Peoria Battery, it took position in the field, and opened a fire on the rebel guns so accurate and severe that it again silenced them, killing the horses of one piece, and as our advance was close upon them, they were compelled to abandon it, and it was soon after taken possession of by the Eighth Illinois, Stevenson’s brigade, Logan’s division. We continued in pursuit, without further incident of importance, until we received orders from you to abandon it and move up on the Edwards Station road to join the First Brigade, which we did, overtaking it at the station, and going into camp there for the night.

Although my brigade was not permitted to take a very prominent part in the battle of Champion’s Hill, still, enough was done to enable me to prove my men and satisfy myself thoroughly of their valor and soldierly qualities(69).

 

Captain Charles N. Lee of the 22^nd Iowa wrote this account of the Battle of Champion’s Hill:

When it was announced that the enemy were retreating and falling back in the direction of Vicksburg, the Twenty-second Iowa was among the first to march forward in pursuit. After a long and tedious march through dust, mud, rain, and the extreme heat, for several days in rapid succession, we came in contact with the enemy, posted in a strong position on Champion’s Hill, where on that memorable day was fought the bloodiest battle of the war, ending in the most disastrous defeat of the rebel army under General Pemberton. In this bloody engagement General Carr’s division, of which the Twenty-second Iowa formed a part, was in the reserve. In maneuvering to outflank the enemy and cut off their retreat, we captured nearly 200 prisoners, who were compelled to fall into our hands, being unable to follow their comrades, who, terror-stricken and demoralized, were fleeing in every direction(70).

 

J.C. Switzer of the 22^nd Iowa was ill during the Battle of Port Gibson and did not fight with the regiment. He recovered in time to see action at Champion’s Hill and wrote this account of his first real encounter with the Confederates:

May 16^th, 1863 occurred the battle of Champion’s Hill, the first battle in which I was engaged. The 13^th Corps was in reserve that day until toward evening and we did not see very much fighting. However, late in the afternoon, we were moved forward into line of battle toward the left of the army and took a position in the edge of the piece of timber, receiving a severe shelling from the enemy. The solid shot and shell went whistling and roaring over our heads and we were lying on arms unable to do anything toward defending ourselves¾ this is considered the severest trial to a soldier. But inaction did not last long. Our Company [Switzer was in Company A] together with Company B, were deployed as skirmishers and commenced an advance over the field, feeling for the enemy. During our waiting spell in the timber we witnessed a very stubbornly contested fight on our left, a regiment of Union troops endeavoring to capture a battery in a little strip of timber in their front. The little band of Union men were slowly driven back, leaving the open field strewn with dead and wounded, but stubbornly contesting every inch of ground. This sight, very often witnessed in war, to a soldier who had not been in battle before, was anything but encouraging¾ it was not calculated to steady his nerve. However, after getting into action, moving over the field in skirmish line, and finding no considerable body of enemy in our front, the tension of the nerves, caused by the suspense of waiting, was relieved and we moved along as if we were simply marching into camp. Having found no rebels, Captain Lee rallied our Company into column and we were marching forward over the field in the direction the enemy had taken, when without any warning, from a little bunch of timber to our left front, we received a volley of musketry which stopped our march for the time being. Hardly had we time to consider whether to retreat or advance on the enemy, when a battery of our light artillery came flying past us to our right, unlimbered within a hundred yards of us, fired a shot or two into the little strip of timber, and the enemy were gone. They were at the time we entered the battle in retreat and our movements only assisted in hastening their flight. The enemy were completely routed in the battle, in which the 24^th Iowa did the hardest fighting and received the severest punishment(71).

 

General Hovey described the scene after the battle, "Champion Hill was, after the battle, literally the hill of death, men, horses, cannon, and the debris of an army lay scattered in wild confusion. Hundreds of the gallant Twelfth Division were cold in death or writhing in pain and . . . lay, dead, dying, or wounded, intermixed with our fallen foe(72)." The Confederates lost over 3,800 men at Champion’s Hill, while the Union suffered about 2,400 killed and wounded. Beaten at all points, the enemy fled in confusion along the main road leading to Vicksburg. The Union forces, with General Carr’s Division (including the 22^nd Iowa) in advance, pursued the retreating enemy. They were soon to meet again, this time on the road to Vicksburg as it crosses the Big Black River.

67.Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 1, p. 149.

68. Ibid., p. 150.

69. Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 2, pgs 134-135.

70. Official Records, Vol XXIV, Part 2, pgs. 243-244.

71. Switzer, History I, pgs 331-332.

72. Stephenson, Jon. "Literal Hill of Death." America’s Civil War Magazine. November 1991, p. 29.

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